










WAGE AND LABOUR 
COST DYNAMICS In 2007 all ECB 
publications 
feature a motif 
taken from the 
€20 banknote.
WORKING PAPER SERIES
NO 778 / JULY 2007
1   We are grateful to Ken Chay, Maia Güell, Enrico Moretti, Michele Pellizzari, and Steve Pischke for useful suggestions and to Agata 
Maida for providing data. Comments from seminars participants at University of California at Berkeley, University of Milan, 
University of Salerno, University of Padova, University of Venezia, Fifth IZA/SOLE Transatlantic Meeting, 7th ECB/CEPR Labour 
Market Workshop are also gratefully acknowledged. We thank Giuseppe Tattara and Marco Valentini for providing us the VWH 
(Veneto Workers History) dataset (Miur Projects 1999-2001 #9913193479 and 2001-2003 #2001134473). Part of this 
paper was written while the first author was visiting the University of California at Berkeley and the second author was visiting 
the European University Institute. Their hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
2   University of Milan and IZA, via Festa del Perdono 7, 20122 Milan, Italy; e-mail: marco.leonardi@unimi.it
3   University of Salerno and CSEF, via Ponte don Melillo, 84084 Fisciano, Italy; e-mail: gpica@unisa.it
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION 
LEGISLATION AND WAGES 1 
by Marco Leonardi 2
and Giovanni Pica 3
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 




 COST DYNAMICS© European Central Bank, 2007
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone 




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Any reproduction, publication and 
reprint in the form of a different 
publication, whether printed or 
produced electronically, in whole or in 
part, is permitted only with the explicit 
written authorisation of the ECB or the 
author(s).
The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reflect those of the European 
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB 
Working Paper Series is available from 
the ECB website, http://www.ecb.int.
ISSN 1561-0810 (print)
ISSN 1725-2806 (online)
ECB/CEPR Labour Market Workshop on 
“Wage and Labour Cost Dynamics” 
 
This paper was presented at the ECB/CEPR Labour Market Workshop on "Wage and 
Labour Cost Dynamics", held on 14-15 December 2006 in Frankfurt am Main, 
Germany. The workshop was organized by Torben M Andersen (Universitet Aarhus and 
CEPR), Samuel Bentolila (CEMFI and CEPR), Ana Lamo (ECB) and Jarkko Turunen 
(ECB). The conference programme, including papers, can be found on the ECB’s web 
site http://www.ecb.int/events/conferences/html/wage_and_labour.en.html 
 
The views expressed in the paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the Eurosystem. 3
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 778
July 2007
CONTENTS
Abstract   4
Non-technical summary  5
1 Introduction  6
2 The  institutional  background  8
  2.1  The evolution of employment protection
    regulations in Italy  8
  2.2  Wage formation in Italy  9
3 Data  description  10
  3.1  Sample selection rules  11
4 Theoretical  background  11
5 Identification  strategy  12
  5.1 Workers’  sorting  18
  5.2 Firms’  sorting  20
  5.3 Regression  model  22
  5.4  Firms’ sorting and the IV model  24
6  The effects of the 1990 reform  24
  24
 
   workers  25
  6.3  IV results   26
  6.4  Results by industry and occupation  27
7 Conclusion  28
References   29
Tables     32
European Central Bank Working Paper Series  41
6.2  Results on the sample of displaced 
6.1  Results on the sample of new hires Abstract
In a perfect labor market severance payments can have no real eﬀects as they can
be undone by a properly designed labor contract (Lazear 1990). We give empirical
content to this proposition by estimating the eﬀects of EPL on entry wages and on
the tenure-wage proﬁle in a quasi-experimental setting. We consider a reform that
introduced unjust-dismissal costs in Italy for ﬁrms below 15 employees, leaving ﬁring
costs unchanged for bigger ﬁrms. Estimates which account for the endogeneity of the
treatment status due to workers and ﬁrms sorting around the 15 employees threshold
show no eﬀect of the reform on entry wages and a decrease of the returns to tenure by
around 20% in the ﬁrst year and by 8% over the ﬁrst two years. We interpret these
ﬁndings as broadly consistent with Lazear’s (1990) prediction that ﬁrms make workers
prepay the severance cost.
Keywords: Costs of Unjust Dismissals, Severance Payments, Regression Discon-
tinuity Design.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E24, J63, J65.
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Non technical summary 
 
Studying the effects of Employment protection legislation is crucial to understand the response of 
the labor market to government policy intended to protect workers. While most literature 
concentrates on the effect of EPL on the employment stock and flows, this paper looks at the effect 
on wages. It is well known that in theory, in a market without frictions, government-mandated firing 
costs which involve a transfer from firms to workers in case of dismissal have no employment 
effect and are reflected only into changes of the individual earnings profiles. Firms undo the policy 
and leave the expected present value of their cumulative wage bill (inclusive of the severance 
payment) unchanged requiring workers to pay a fee upon entry that is equal to the value of the 
severance payment. This paper uses a natural experiment from Italy to estimate to which extent 
firms pass on to workers the increase in costs. In 1990, Italy introduced a labour market reform 
which increased the severance payment (i.e. the transfer part of the firing costs) of workers 
employed in firms with fewer than 15 employees from zero to between 2.5 and 6 months of pay, 
leaving firing costs unchanged for workers employed in firms with more than 15 employees.  
We compare wages of individuals who work in firms in a neighborhood of the 15 employees 
threshold before and after the reform and we address the crucial issue of the endogeneity of the 
threshold. On the one side, it is possible that marginal firms which kept their size just below 15 
before the reform to avoid strict EPL rules, increased their size because of the reform. On the other 
side, also workers may sort around the 15 employees threshold. Individuals with different 
preferences over a menu of employment protection and wages may move from big to small firms 
(or viceversa) because of the EPL reform. In both cases the estimation would suffer from an 
endogeneity bias. To address the sorting of workers around the threshold, we look at workers 
involuntary displaced due to plant closings in the two previous years. An instrumental variable 
strategy is adopted to address the sorting of firms. We instrument the current firm size dummy with 
firm size dummies in the pre-reform period, when the reform was not in place and was arguably 
unexpected. 
We find that government-mandated EPL had a significant negative impact on the tenure-wage 
profile of displaced workers. This can be quantified in a reduction of the average returns to tenure 
of displaced male workers by around 3% in firms below 15 employees, relative to larger firms. The 
decline is concentrated in the first two years of tenure where it reaches 22%. We conclude that firms 
do get around government-mandated EPL and are able to translate around 44% of the expected 
firing cost onto lower wages. 
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Since the work of Lazear (1990), it is well-known that in a Coasean world ﬁring costs which
involve a transfer from ﬁrms to workers in case of dismissal have no employment eﬀects and
are reﬂected only into changes of the individual earnings proﬁles. In presence of government-
mandated severance pay, ﬁrms require workers to pay a fee upon entry that is equal to the
value of the stream of the future severance payments. Under risk neutrality this scheme leaves
the expected present value of the cumulative wage bill (inclusive of the severance payment)
unchanged and has no eﬀects on employment. Alternatively, if dismissal protections cannot
be undone by Coasean bargaining, theory predicts that Employment Protection Legislation
( E P L )a c t sa sat a xo nﬁring and reduces both accessions and separations with an ambiguous
eﬀect on the employment level.
This paper focusses on the wage eﬀects of EPL and evaluates whether and to which extent
stricter EPL aﬀects both entry wages and the tenure proﬁle using a natural experiment from
Italy. In 1990, Italy introduced a labour market reform which increased the severance pay-
ment (i.e. the transfer part of the ﬁring costs) of workers employed in ﬁrms with fewer than
15 employees from zero to between 2.5 and 6 months of pay, leaving ﬁring costs unchanged
for workers employed in ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n1 5e m p l o y e e s .
Previous literature mostly concentrates on the eﬀects of EPL on employment ﬂows, often
using the cross-state variation of EPL within the US. Autor (2003) looks at the eﬀect of
EPL on the use of temporary help agencies. Autor et al. (2004 and 2006) study the eﬀect
on employment. Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) consider re-employment probabilities. To
our knowledge the only paper which looks at the eﬀect of EPL on productivity (measured
as value added per worker) at the establishment-level data is Autor et al. (2007). They
ﬁnd that the adoption of wrongful discharge protections reduced total factor productivity in
the adopting US states. Some papers exploit the discontinuities in ﬁring costs regimes that
apply to ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes within countries. Boeri and Jimeno (2005) assess the eﬀect
of EPL on lay-oﬀ probabilities by comparing ﬁrms below and above 15 employees in Italy.
Kugler and Pica (2007) exploit the diﬀerential change in ﬁring costs for unfair dismissals in
large and small ﬁrms after 1990 in Italy to look at the eﬀects of changes in EPL on job and
workers ﬂows.
This paper uses the variation of EPL both across ﬁrms (below and above 15 employees)
and over time (before and after 1990) in Italy. We identify the eﬀects of employment pro-
tection legislation on wages through a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) and compare
wages of individuals who work in ﬁr m si nan e i g h bo r h oodo ft h e1 5e m p l o y e e st h r e s h o l dbe f o r e
6
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for individuals employed in ﬁrms marginally above the 15 employees threshold represents a
valid counterfactual for the treated group employed in ﬁrms just below the threshold. One
natural concern, in our case, is the endogeneity of the treatment status. Both ﬁrms and
workers may sort above and below the 15 employees threshold. In fact, if there are ben-
eﬁts to receiving the treatment, it is natural to expect those who gain the most to select
themselves into the treatment group.
O nt h eo n es i d e ,i ti sp o s s i b l et h a tm a r g i n a lﬁrms which kept their size just below 15 before
the reform to avoid strict EPL rules, increased their size because of the reform. Consistently
with previous literature (Borgarello, Garibaldi and Pacelli 2002, and Schivardi and Torrini,
2004), we ﬁnd that the propensity to grow of ﬁrms at the 15 employees threshold increases
after the 1990 reform. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the increase in the propensity to grow is larger
for more productive ﬁrms. On the other side, also workers may sort around the 15 employees
threshold. Individuals with diﬀerent preferences over a menu of employment protection and
w a g e sm a ym o v ef r o mb i gt os m a l lﬁrms (or viceversa) because of the EPL reform. The
evidence points to an increase in the probability of moving to large ﬁrms after the reform for
workers of small ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd that most productive workers have a higher propensity
to move away from small ﬁrms.
In order to identify the causal eﬀect of EPL on wages, we purge the empirical analysis
from the composition eﬀects due to the sorting of workers and ﬁrms into the treatment status.
To address the sorting of workers, we look at exogenously displaced workers. We identify
all plant closings in the dataset and look at post-displacement wages of workers involuntary
displaced due to plant closings in the two previous years. We show that the allocation of
displaced workers in ﬁrms below and above the 15 employees threshold is random both before
and after the reform. An instrumental variable strategy is adopted to address the sorting of
ﬁrms: the current ﬁrm size is instrumented with ﬁrm size dummies in the pre-reform period
(1989-1988-1987), when the reform was not in place and was arguably unexpected.
We use administrative data from the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS), and exploit
a matched employer-employee panel which contains the entire population of workers and
ﬁrms located in the Italian provinces of Vicenza and Treviso, an area characterized by a
tight labor market and a high concentration of small ﬁrms. OLS estimates obtained on the
“Sample of displaced workers” indicate no eﬀect (or at best a weak negative eﬀect) of the
reform on entry wages and a signiﬁcantly ﬂatter tenure-wage proﬁle. These estimates are
robust to the inclusion among the regressors of polynomials of various orders in ﬁrm size
and to the inclusion of industry ﬁxed eﬀects, time eﬀects and individual characteristics. The
7
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ﬁr m sr e l a t i v et ol a r g eﬁrms after the reform. The IV results conﬁrm that the reform had a
signiﬁcant negative impact on the tenure-wage proﬁle of displaced workers. Interestingly, it
appears that the eﬀect of the reform on the tenure-wage proﬁle is strongest after the ﬁrst
year of tenure and decreases over time. This suggests that ﬁrms, possibly unable to lower
entry wages because of institutional constraints (e.g. wage minima), shift part of the ﬁring
costs onto workers by reducing the returns to tenure right after entry.
Finally, we provide results on industries and occupations with diﬀerent degrees of wage
ﬂexibility captured by an average measure of the wage drift. Lazear’s model predicts that
t h ew a g ee ﬀect of EPL is larger where the wage drift is higher, while adjustment through
employment ﬂo w si sl a r g e rw h e r et h ew a g ed r i f ti sl o w e r .R e s u l t sb yi n d u s t r ya n do c c u p a t i o n
do not deliver any clear pattern, however, the existence of a negative correlation between
wage and employment adjustment cannot be ruled out at a lower level of aggregation or at
the ﬁrm level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how ﬁring restrictions
evolved in Italy. Section 3 describes the dataset and the sample selection rules. Section
4 reviews the theoretical literature. Section 5 explains the identiﬁcation strategy used to
evaluate the impact of EPL on the wage distribution. Section 6 presents OLS and IV
estimates of the impact of increased strictness of employment protection in small ﬁrms in
Italy after 1990 on average wages. Section 7 concludes.
2 The institutional background
2.1 The evolution of Employment Protection regulations in Italy
Over the years the Italian legislation ruling unfair dismissals has changed several times. Both
the magnitude of the ﬁring cost and the coverage of the ﬁrms subject to the restrictions have
gone through extensive changes.
Dismissals were ﬁrst regulated in Italy in 1966 through Law 604, which established that,
in case of unfair dismissal, employers had the choice to either reinstate workers or pay
severance, which depended on tenure and ﬁrm size. Severance pay for unfair dismissals
ranged between 5 and 8 months for workers with less than two and a half years of tenure,
between 5 and 12 months for those between two and a half and 20 years of tenure, and
between 5 and 14 months for workers with more than 20 years of tenure in ﬁrms with more
than 60 employees. Firms with fewer than 60 employees had to pay half the severance paid
8
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In 1970, the Statuto dei Lavoratori (Law 300) established that all ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n1 5
employees had to reinstate workers and pay their foregone wages in case of unfair dismissals.
Firms with fewer than 15 employees remained exempt.
Finally, Law 108 was introduced in July 1990 restricting dismissals for permanent con-
tracts. In particular, this law introduced severance payments of between 2.5 and 6 months
pay for unfair dismissals in ﬁrms with fewer than 15 employees. Firms with more than 15
employees still had to reinstate workers and pay foregone wages in case of unfair dismissals.2
This means that the cost of unfair dismissals for ﬁrms with fewer than 15 employees increased
relative to the cost for ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n1 5e m p l o y e e sa f t e r1 9 9 0 . 3
2.2 Wage Formation in Italy
The eﬀect of EPL on wages depends on the diﬀusion of company-level bargaining and on
t h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h eﬁrm-speciﬁc wage components. In Italy there are three levels of
wage bargaining, economy-wide, industry-wide and company-level agreements. In terms
of diﬀusion, half of Italian workers were involved in ﬁrm-level negotiations in the period
covered by our sample.4 The presence of a company-agreement increases with ﬁrm size.
In terms of magnitude of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc part of the wage, estimates based on data in
the metal products, machinery and equipment industry indicate that between one sixth
and one quarter of the compensation is ﬁrm-speciﬁc.5 Overall, an important part of the
compensation of employees (company-level wage increments, production bonuses and other
variable compensations) is determined at the ﬁrm level (Guiso et al., 2005). This opens the
possibility for EPL changes to aﬀect individual wages. It has to be noticed that the available
estimates of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc part of the wage are average measures while what is strictly
relevant for Lazear’s (1990) model to work is contractual ﬂexibility at the moment of entry
in the ﬁrm.
1See Boeri and Jimeno (2003) for a theoretical explanation of why these exemptions may be in place.
2Notice that this change in EPL concerned the transfer part of EPL (severance payments). Overall, the
transfer part has been estimated to be 80% of the total ﬁring cost (Garibaldi and Violante, 2005).
3Overall, Italy, together with other Southern European countries, is considered one of the strictest coun-
tries in terms of employment protection legislation. See, for instance, Lazear (1990), Bertola (1990), OECD’s
Employment Outlook (1999) and Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000).
4Yearly report of CESOS, an association of trade unions.
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by ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a n6 0e m p l o y e e s ,a n dﬁrms with fewer than 35 workers were completely3 Data description
The VWH data set is an employer-employee panel with information on the characteristics
of both workers and ﬁrms. The longitudinal panel is constructed from the administrative
records of the Italian Social Security System (Inps). It refers to the entire population of
employers and workers of the private sector in two provinces, Treviso and Vicenza, of the
Italian region of Veneto. The two provinces are located in the North-eastern part of the
country. In year 2000 GDP per capita was 22,400 euros, 20% higher than the national
average and accounted for 3.3% of the Italian GDP. The overall population was 1.6 million
people (2.7% of the total Italian population) as of the 2001 Population Census.6 Although
limited to two relatively small provinces, the data are well suited for studying the eﬀect of the
1990 EPL reform because the Italian North-East is characterized by a high concentration
of small ﬁrms and tight labor market. Moreover, the availability of information on the
universe of workers and ﬁrms allows to build suitable instruments for ﬁrm size and apply IV
techniques. The use of a random sample of the Italian working population would only allow
OLS estimates (available upon request).
The data include universal information on all plants and employees working at least one
day in any plant of the two provinces from 1984 to 1994. The unit of observation is the
employer-day; such information is used to build a monthly history of the working life of each
employee. Once they are in the dataset, employees are followed, independently of their place
of residence, even in their occupational spells out of Treviso and Vicenza.
The only reason of dropping out of the dataset is exit from the private sector or from the
employment status altogether. Since the individual longitudinal records are generated using
social security numbers and collect information on private sector employees for the purpose of
computing retirement beneﬁts, employees are only followed through their employment spells.
The data stop following individuals who move into self-employment, the public sector, the
agricultural sector, the underground economy, unemployment, and retirement.
The data include information on employees’ age, gender, occupation (blue collar-white
collar), yearly wage, number of paid weeks, type of contract (permanent-temporary), and
information on ﬁrms’ location, sector of employment, average number of employees and date
6The average establishment size in Veneto is 13 employees. Half of the employment stock is not subject to
protection against dismissal as stated by art. 18 of the Statuto dei Lavoratori. For a decade Veneto has been
also a full employment region with a positive rate of job creation in manufacturing, compared to a negative
national rate and positive migration ﬂows. Typical manufacturing activities are garments, mechanical goods,
goldsmiths, leather, textile, furniture and plastics. The stock of manufacturing workers in the two Veneto
provinces of Treviso and Vicenza has varied between 194.000 employees in the early eighties and 233.000
employees in 1996, with a yearly positive average rate of variation of 1.4%. The average rate of growth in
employment is the result of a marked increase in white collars and women (see Tattara and Valentini, 2005).
10
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 778
July 2007
of closure.3.1 Sample selection rules
We select all males of age between 21 and 55 and, in order to preserve sample size, we focus
on the years 1986-1994. We remove year 1990 because the reform occurred in the month of
July and the wages of year 1990 are likely to be a mixture of pre-reform and post-reform
wages. Since we are interested in the relative wages in ﬁrms close to the threshold, and
to preserve the comparability of treatment and control groups, we eliminate all ﬁrms with
f e w e rt h a n1 0e m p l o y e e sa n dw i t hm o r et h a n2 0e m p l o y e e s .I nt h ec o u r s eo ft h ep a p e rw e
use weekly wages after eliminating the upper and lower 1% of the wage distribution in each
year. For the cases of multiple individual spells in the same year we keep the longest spell.
4 Theoretical background
Lazear’s (1990) competitive model posits that any “state mandated severance pay can be
undone in a perfect market by an appropriately designed labor contract. Thus, without
frictions severance pay can have no eﬀect” (Lazear, 1990). Suppose that the government
imposes a requirement that all workers who sign a contract in period 1 be paid Q as a
severance pay if they are not employed in period 2. Let A∗ be the reservation wage of the
marginal worker and M∗ the reservation wage of the marginal ﬁrm. After the introduction
of severance pay the same equilibrium is maintained if the wage in period 2 is equal to
W
0 = A∗ + Q = M∗ + Q, i.e. the wage in period two increases by the amount of the
severance pay. To oﬀset this, in period 1 ﬁrms require workers to pay a fee such that the
expected compensation on signing the contract for any given worker is the same as it was
before. The fee in period 1 is exactly equal to the amount of the severance pay. Thus, total
compensation remains unchanged because in period 2, the worker receives the higher wage
W
0 = A∗+Q if employed, and Q if not employed. In summary, with perfectly ﬂexible wages
and risk neutrality, EPL raises the cost of employment and leads to an inward shift in labor
demand but wages fall and shift labor supply outwards to oﬀset the increase in cost; as a
result employment levels are unchanged.
Even under risk neutrality, Coasean bargaining may not be feasible in presence of contrac-
tual rigidities or of market imperfections like binding minimum wages (Bertola and Rogerson,
1997), and government-mandated severance pay may have real eﬀects. In this case, theory
predicts that ﬁrms hire and ﬁre less with an ambiguous eﬀect on the employment level. EPL
has real eﬀects also if workers are risk averse and value job security. In this case they accept
11
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a lower expected present value of the cumulative wage bill in return for greater stability.Diﬀerently from competitive models, much work in the macroeconomics of EPL is based
on matching models where rents are split by Nash bargaining. Nash bargaining implies
diﬀerent wages for insiders and outsiders because they have diﬀerent outside options and
only insiders are protected by ﬁring costs. Garibaldi and Violante (2005) show that the
impact of severance payments on employment diﬀers according to the bite of wage rigidity.
If entry wages are not responsive to EPL (for example because of minimum wages), severance
payments may increase unemployment. Diﬀerently, if entry wages are ﬂexible, EPL reduces
unemployment even if insiders’ wages are rigid (for example because of union bargaining).
Ljunqvist (2002) shows that the eﬀects of ﬁring taxes on employment depend on the model
of employment and wage determination (competitive, matching or search model) and on
the speciﬁc assumption on how lay-oﬀ costs aﬀect the bargaining game between ﬁrms and
workers.7 Finally Güell (2000) shows that in an eﬃciency wage framework where workers’
eﬀort can only be monitored imperfectly, severance payments increase wages of insiders in
equilibrium. Since the transfer increases the value of being unemployed and makes the
punishment for shirking less eﬀective, ﬁrms reduce labor demand and raise wages to restore
the incentives to work.
Although macroeconomic models focus on how the relative importance of insiders and
outsiders wage setting might reﬂect on equilibrium employment rates, they share the basic
prediction with the competitive model: in presence of wage ﬂexibility at entry, the market
perfectly oﬀsets the employment eﬀects of EPL. These theoretical considerations motivate
our focus on the analysis of the wage eﬀects of EPL separately at entry and on subsequent
wages.
5I d e n t i ﬁcation strategy
In order to identify the impact of dismissal costs on the wage distribution, we compare the
change in mean wages paid by ﬁrms just below 15 employees before and after the 1990 reform
to the change in mean wages paid by ﬁrms just above 15 employees.
In a classical randomized experiment, a sharp Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
requires a dichotomous treatment i.e. a deterministic function of a single variable (S)w i t h
a known point of its support (¯ s) where the probability of being treated changes from 0 to 1.
7The key diﬀerence between Ljunqvist (2002) and Garibaldi and Violante (2005) is that the former focuses
on ﬁring taxes and the latter on the transfer part of EPL. In the empirical analysis, it is diﬃcult to distinguish
a transfer from a tax. In our case, we consider a reform in EPL which increases severance pay obligations
(a transfer) on small ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the reform also entails a tax in as much there is an additional
possibility to go to court.
12
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takes place at the threshold for selection (see Battistin and Rettore, 2006, and Hahn et al.,
2001).
In our case, EPL varies both among ﬁrms and over time. The treatment status depends
on ﬁrm size but participation to the treatment group changes discontinuously at the 15
employees threshold after the 1990 reform. Thus, the identifying assumption requires that
the relationship between wages and ﬁrm size around the threshold ¯ s would not change in
absence of the reform, i.e. the diﬀerence between wages paid in ﬁrms slightly above and below
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where w0 is the counterfactual wage in the absence of the reform and ¯ s+ and ¯ s− refer to
units marginally above or below ¯ s. This condition for identiﬁcation requires that in the
counterfactual world the size of the discontinuity (if any) is identical before and after the
1990 reform.
In the empirical analysis, we identify the mean eﬀect of the 1990 EPL reform on wages
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The identiﬁcation assumption in a RDD is essentially that the average outcome for individ-
uals marginally above the threshold represents a valid counterfactual for the treated group
just below the threshold. In this regard, we have an advantage with respect to RDD studies
which compare diﬀerent groups around the threshold in that we exploit the time dimension of
the reform. We essentially compare wages of individuals who work in ﬁrms just below the 15
employees threshold with wages of individuals who work in ﬁr m sj u s ta b o v et h e1 5e m p l o y -
ees threshold, before and after the reform. Exploiting the temporal variation in EPL which
aﬀected diﬀerentially small and large ﬁrms, we are able to control for time-invariant unob-
servable diﬀerences in the two groups of ﬁrms. Moreover, as the identiﬁcation assumption of
the RDD implies that close to the threshold all variables determined prior to assignment are
independent of treatment status (Lee, 2007), we will be able to further assess the validity
of the RDD by comparing the means of predetermined variables conditional on treatment
around the threshold. Table 9, discussed in section 6.3, provides such evidence.
The strategy to identify the impact of the change in dismissal costs is illustrated in
Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 considers a sample of new hires, i.e. a sample of workers appearing
for the ﬁr s tt i m ei nag i v e nﬁrm coming either from another ﬁrm or from outside the sample.
13
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July 2007Figure 1: Wages of all new hires. Non parametric prediction of the average real wage from a
weighted local linear regression smoother with bandwith 0.8, estimated separately for each
side of 15 employees threshold.
It plots the mean wage (including both entry wages and subsequent wages) against ﬁrm size
before (1986-1989) and after the reform in the period (1991-1994) and in the period (1995-
1997). The mean is estimated non parametrically separately for each side of the threshold.
The RDD identiﬁes the eﬀect of EPL on wages as the diﬀerence between average wages of
ﬁrms in a neighborhood of the 15 employees threshold before and after the reform.
Figure 1 shows no discontinuity at the 15 employees threshold, neither before nor after
1990. According to Lazear’s (1990) model with homogeneous workers and ﬁrms, one should
expect a discontinuous downward jump at 15 in Figure 1 before the reform (1986-1989) and
a reduction of the gap after the reform (1991-1994) and (1995-1997).8 Lazear (1990) predicts
that in a Coasean market with ﬂexible wages the market oﬀsets the severance payment and
leaves the cumulative wage bill (inclusive of the severance payment) unchanged. The full
wage oﬀset implies a discontinuity at 15 before the reform in Figure 1 (which plots wages of
new entrants and does not include the severance payment9), with a wage-penalty for workers
employed in ﬁrms just above the 15 employees threshold that pay higher severance payments.
8Recall that the 1990 reform only reduces the gap in job security provisions between small and large ﬁrms.
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from a weighted local linear regression smoother with bandwith 0.8, estimated separately for
each side of 15 employees threshold.
After t h er e f o r m ,o n es h o u l de x p e c tar e d u c t i o ni nt h eh y p o t h e t i c a lg a pi nF i g u r e1( b u tn o t
full continuity), because although the reform narrows the gap between employment security
provisions guaranteed in ﬁrms above and below 15 employees, EPL is still stricter in ﬁrms
with more than 15 employees after 1990.
Notwithstanding Lazear’s predictions, the continuity of the relationship before (1986-
1989) and much after the reform (1995-1997) does not come entirely as a surprise. If workers
(and ﬁrms) are heterogenous in terms of preferences (and costs) of EPL, they may select
around the 15 employees threshold possibly leaving the wage-ﬁrm size relationship continuous
at 15. For example, high ability workers, who earn ceteris paribus higher wages, may self-
select into larger ﬁrms (e.g. because of better career prospects). This would act as a
confounding factor in our graphical analysis and contribute to restore continuity at 15. On
the ﬁrms’ side, the same companies right above the 15 employees threshold which should
in principle pay lower wages because they have higher EPL costs, could be more capital
intensive10 or could use more intensively ﬁxed-term employment contracts which are exempt
from EPL (Schivardi and Torrini, 2004). This could bring their wages in line with those paid
10Evidence in this direction has been found by for the US by Autor et al. (2007).
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costs. All this implies that the identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of EPL on wages from the steady
state relationship between wages and ﬁrm size is made very diﬃcult because of workers’ and
ﬁrms’ selection eﬀects.
O u rs t r a t e g yi st oi d e n t i f yt h ee ﬀect of an unexpected change in EPL (the reform in 1990)
on wages. Starting from a steady state where wages are continuous at 15 (as in Figure 1 in the
period 1986-1989), theory predicts that wages go down in ﬁrms below the threshold to oﬀset
the increase in EPL costs. To this extent the continuity of the wage-ﬁrm size relationship
in the period immediately after the reform (1991-1994) is more troubling. Nonetheless, the
evidence of a smooth relationship between ﬁrm size and wages in the immediate aftermath
of the EPL reform does not rule out the presence of an eﬀect of the EPL reform on wages.
The reason is that even after an unexpected reform, the eﬀect of EPL on wages may be
confounded by concurrent employment ﬂows.11
One possibility is that the 1990 reform induced a wage cut for workers employed in
small ﬁrms and a concurrent outﬂow of workers towards ﬁr m sa b o v e1 5 . T h i s“ s u p p l y
eﬀect” may have depressed wages of ﬁrms above the 15 employees threshold and blurred
the discontinuity.12 In other words, if workers can inﬂuence their own treatment status (and
voluntary changers presumably choose the ﬁrm they move into), this violates the assumption
of random assignment and possibly invalidates the identiﬁcation assumption in Figure 1 and
equation (1).
To assess if workers’ sorting has something to do with the smooth relationship between
wage and ﬁrm size, we replicate the same graphs using a sample of exogenously displaced
workers. Similarly to Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993), the idea is that displaced
workers are less likely than those who voluntarily change ﬁrm, to sort themselves in ﬁrms
around the threshold only of the reform. To deﬁn et h es a m p l eo fd i s p l a c e dw o r k e r sw e
identify all plant closings in the dataset and look at post-displacement wages of those who
11In Lazear’s model workers are risk neutral and the equilibrium after the change in EPL is such that (1)
the marginal worker and the marginal ﬁrm remain the same; (2) t h es a m ew o r k e r sw o r k ;a n d(3) the same
ﬁrms employ labor as without state mandated severance pay. In this model the absence of employment ﬂows
identiﬁes the eﬀect of EPL on wages. But there are many reasons that can impede full wage adjustment and
induce employment ﬂo w s .O n eo ft h e mi st h a ti fw o r k e r sa r er i s ka v e r s ea n dv a l u ej o bs e c u r i t yper se,t h e
introduction of severance pay could generate workers sorting, i.e. ﬂows of workers between more protected
jobs and less protected jobs. In a sample of new hires (i.e new entrants in the labor market or job changers)
workers can choose the ﬁrm they move to.
12An additionally or alternative explanation of the absence of discontinuity in the wage ﬁrm size relation-
ship among new hires is that the reform may have changed the composition of workers ﬂo w i n gt os m a l lo r
big ﬁrms in the direction of "better" workers ﬂo w i n gt os m a l lﬁrms. This composition eﬀect could have oﬀset
the wage cut in small ﬁrms caused by the reform. This eﬀect is unlikely to be at work because it would
imply that more able workers move to ﬁrms which are concurrently lowering their wages.
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for work before the reform took place.13
Figure 2 plots the relationship between post-displacement wages and ﬁrm size for a
sample of displaced workers. It shows evidence of a discontinuous jump in the relationship
between ﬁrm size and wages right at the 15 employees threshold after the reform. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that after the reform workers in ﬁrms smaller than 15 obtained
lower wages in exchange of higher employment protection (at least when one controls for
the sorting of workers). Of course, the mere fact that they were exogenously displaced is
not enough to guarantee that they do not sort into smaller or bigger ﬁrms according to
their preferences. The post-displacement wage-ﬁrm size relationship may still be aﬀected by
composition eﬀects. But the fact that displaced workers were looking for work before the
(unexpected) reform took place, makes them less likely to inﬂuence their treatment status
in the aftermath of the reform. In section 6.3, we provide a formal test, in the spirit of Lee
(2007), showing that after the reform displaced workers are indeed randomly allocated in
small and large ﬁrms. Thus, in our empirical exercise identiﬁcation essentially comes from
displaced workers being taken by surprise in the immediate aftermath of the reform.
With the passage of time, there is no particular reason to consider the sample of displaced
workers more exogenous than the sample of new hires. As we argue that the identiﬁcation
of the eﬀect of EPL on the wages of the displaced comes from the discontinuity surrounding
the passage of the 1990 reform, we would be concerned to see the eﬀects of the reform on
post-displacement wages before the reform. To verify if the discontinuity picks up the causal
eﬀect of the 1990 reform rather than other coincidental trends we plot the wage ﬁrm-size
relationship in earlier years. The result of this falsiﬁcation exercise indicates that there is
no discontinuity in the years (1986-1989). Moreover, we plot the wage-ﬁrm size relationship
in later years after the reform (1995-1997) and ﬁnd no sign of discontinuity. Overall Figure
2 is consistent with a causal short-term eﬀect of the reform on post displacement wages.
The presence of the discontinuity at 15 in Figure 2 and its absence in Figure 1 points to the
necessity to take into account workers’ sorting when estimating the eﬀect of EPL on wages.
F o rt h i sr e a s o nw ew i l lr e l yo nt h es a m p l eo fd i s p l a c e dw o r k e r s .
So far we have focussed on workers’ sorting because its eﬀects are evident in the compar-
ison between Figure 1 and 2. However the identiﬁcation of equation (1) is also threatened
by the sorting of ﬁrms. Firms in the neighborhood of the 15 employees’ threshold may vary
their size in response to the 1990 reform of EPL, thus biasing the estimates. Firms which
13Table 1 (described later in more detail) contains descriptive statistics for the sample of Displaced Workers
and shows that the treatment and control groups are similar in terms of observable characteristics around
the threshold, both before and after the reform.
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their size because of the reform. It is not easy to sign the bias due to ﬁrms’ sorting.
If ﬁrms which were keeping their size below 15 before the reform for fear of incurring in a
much higher EPL were those with bad growth perspectives and lower wages, then presumably
OLS estimates understate the eﬀect of the reform on wages. But it may also be the case
that the ﬁrms which were keeping under the threshold were instead those which were paying
higher wages.
To account for ﬁrms’ sorting in a formal regression framework we will use an IV strategy
which basically identiﬁes the eﬀect on wages of those ﬁr m sw h i c hd i dn o tc r o s st h e1 5
employees threshold. In the next two sections we will provide direct evidence on workers’
and ﬁrms’ sorting around the 15 employees threshold, in the attempt to shed light on the
importance of the bias.
5.1 Workers’ sorting
If the reform lowers the wage in small ﬁrms relative to big ﬁrms, one may expect larger
ﬂows of workers from small to big ﬁrms and smaller ﬂows from big to small ﬁrms after the
reform. These ﬂo w sm a yi nt u r nb i a st h ee s t i m a t eo ft h ei m p a c to ft h eE P Lr e f o r mo nw a g e s .
Figure 3 shows the conditional probability that workers move to ﬁrms bigger or smaller than
15 employees (and therefore subject to diﬀerent ﬁring costs regimes) before and after the
reform. In each panel of Figure 3 we estimate the following linear probability model:
yij






0t =1if worker i moves in year t from ﬁrm j of size Sjt−1 (in the horizontal axis
in Figure 3) to a ﬁrm j
0 with more than 15 employees (upper panel of Figure 3) or a ﬁrm
with fewer than 15 employees (lower panel of Figure 3). We split the sample in two periods,
the pre-reform period (from 1986 to 1989) and the post-reform period (from 1991 to 1994).
Figure 3 depicts both the raw proportion of movers and the ﬁtted probability against ﬁrm
size.
Figure 3 shows a smooth pattern of between-ﬁrm mobility both before and after the
reform. At ﬁrst glance, no discontinuities appear after the reform: the graphs show no
evidence of exceptional workers’ ﬂows either to big or small ﬁrms around the time of the
reform. The results above are conditional on moving and the two panels, before and after
the reform, sum vertically to unity.
However, the reform may have had an eﬀect on the unconditional probability of moving.
Moreover, workers could sort according to unobservable characteristics. In order to check
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Figure 3: Upper panel: probability of moving to ﬁrms with 16 or more employees in the pre-
reform period (upper left) and the post reform period (upper right). Lower panel: probability
of moving to ﬁrms with 15 or fewer employees in the pre-reform period (lower left) and the
post reform period (lower right).
this hypothesis, we calculate workers’ ﬁxed eﬀects on the basis of their average wages before
1990 and run regressions of their probability of moving to a big ﬁrm or to a small ﬁrm on an
indicator of small ﬁrm size, year dummies and interactions with workers’ ﬁxed eﬀects. The




















0t =1if worker i moves in year t from ﬁrm j to a ﬁrm j
0 with more than 15
employees (Table 3, columns 1 and 2) or to a ﬁrm j
0 with fewer than 15 employees (Table 3,
columns 3 and 4). DS
jt−1 indicates the ﬁrm size before moving, DS
jt−1 =1if employees ≤ 15
and 0 otherwise. Tt is a set of year dummies and FE i is workers ﬁxed eﬀects. The variable
FEi in the regression above and indicated as Workers Fixed Eﬀect in Table 3 is equal to the
individual’s average wage between 1986 and 1989 purged of age, a third degree polynomial
in ﬁrm size, year and sector dummies.14 The matrix Xijt−1 i n c l u d e saq u a d r a t i ci nw o r k e r s ’
age, sector dummies and a polynomial in the size of the ﬁrm of origin.
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larger than 16 coming from a small ﬁrm after the reform (positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient
on T1991×DS
jt−1). This eﬀect could explain why in Figure 1 we do not observe a discontinuity
at 15 in the wage-ﬁrm size relationship in the aftermath of the reform: because the larger
ﬂow towards bigger ﬁrms has depressed their wage and restored the continuity of the wage-
ﬁrm size relationship. The Table also shows that the probability of moving from a small to
al a r g eﬁrm in the aftermath of the reform is larger for "good" workers with higher than
average wages before 1990 (positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on T1991 ×DS
jt−1 ×FE i). This
eﬀect however is quantitatively modest: one-standard-deviation increase in the workers’ ﬁxed
eﬀect increases the propensity to move from small to big ﬁr m si n1 9 9 1b yo n l ya b o u t0 . 0 1 1
which is 1/25 of one standard deviation).15 There is no evidence of a change after the reform
in the probability of moving from small to small ﬁr m s( c o l u m n s3a n d4 ) .
Overall the evidence is consistent with a larger than average ﬂow of workers towards
ﬁrms bigger than 15 and a pattern of better workers moving out of small ﬁrms which were
reducing wages in the face of higher government-mandated EPL. While a larger than normal
ﬂow of workers form small to big ﬁrms in 1991 may have depressed wages of ﬁrms above the
threshold and may have contributed to hide the discontinuity at 15 in Figure 1, the evidence
on “higher” than average ability of those movers would point in the opposite direction of
increasing the gap between wages in ﬁrms at 15 and 16 in 1991. The outﬂow of high ability
workers out of small ﬁrms which were reducing wages makes economic sense but the estimates
indicate a quantitatively very modest impact which is unlikely to have aﬀected the wage-
ﬁrm size relationship of Figure 1. The evidence of some form of workers’ sorting justiﬁes our
attempt of controlling for workers sorting using displaced workers.
5.2 Firms’ sorting
The average ﬁr ms i z ei nI t a l yi sa p p r o x i m a t e l yh a l fo ft h a to ft h eE u r o p e a nU n i o n .E x p e n s i v e
EPL on ﬁrms larger than 15 is often indicated as one of the factors responsible for such a
skewed size distribution. As in the case of the eﬀect of EPL on wages (Figures 1 and 2), the
identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of EPL on ﬁrm size in equilibrium is hampered by selection eﬀects.
Figure 4 shows the ﬁrm size distribution before and after the reform. Both graphs are smooth
at 15 and show no evidence of lumping at 15. Yet one should not observe any ﬁrm at 16
because the marginal cost of hiring the 16th worker in Italy is huge and aﬀects all previous 15
workers. The non-existence of lumps at 15 can be explained with the fact that ﬁrms choose
15Calculated as (−0.029 + 0.043 + 0.057)/1000 × 166. The standard deviation of workers’ ﬁxed eﬀect is
166, the standard deviation of the propensity to move to a big ﬁrm is 0.25.
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Post-Reform Firm size distribution
Figure 4: Firm Size Distribution. Pre-reform period: 1986-1989; Post-reform period: 1991-
1994
their size on the basis of several factors and not only on the basis of EPL. A more promising
approach is to look at the eﬀect of EPL on the propensity to grow. Schivardi and Torrini
(2004) and Borgarello, Garibaldi and Pacelli (2004) ﬁnd that more stringent job security
provisions hampers ﬁrm growth. They ﬁnd that the discontinuous change in EPL at the 15
employees threshold reduces by 2% the probability that ﬁrms pass the threshold. Although
the eﬀect is quantitatively modest, this ﬁnding suggests that ﬁrms in a neighborhood of the
threshold may vary their size in response to the 1990 change in EPL. The increase in EPL in
1990 applied only to ﬁrms with fewer than 15 workers, therefore it is possible that marginal
ﬁrms which kept their size just below 15 employees before the reform to avoid strict EPL
rules, increased their size because of the reform. This behavior would bias the identiﬁcation
in equation (1).
The observation that there is virtually no change in the ﬁrm size distribution before and
after the reform does not rule out that some ﬁrms may have (partially) oﬀset the increase in
EPL costs with lower wages and that some other may have moved across the threshold. Firms
may sort around the threshold according to observable and unobservable characteristics. To
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ECB 
Working Paper Series No 778
July 2007verify if sorting happens according to pre-existing unobservable characteristics, we calculate
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects on the basis of ﬁrms’ average wages paid before the reform and then we
regress the ﬁrms probability of growing on their size. The regression is of the form:
djt = β
0
Xjt + δ0Post+ δ1dummySjt−1 + δ2FEj + α0 (dummySjt−1 × Post)
+α1 (FE j × Post)+α2 (dummySjt−1 × Post× FE j)+εjt
where djt =1if ﬁrm j in year t has a larger size than in t − 1. dummySjt−1 is a set of
ﬁrm size dummies. FEj is ﬁrm j ﬁxed eﬀect and Post =1if year11991. FE j is the
residual of a regression of ﬁrms’ average wages in 1986-1989 on ﬁrm age, ﬁrm size, sector
and year dummies. The matrix Xjt−1 includes a quadratic in ﬁrms’ age, year dummies,
sector dummies and a polynomial in lagged ﬁrm size.
Column 1 of Table 2 shows that on average ﬁrms just below 15 employees are not less
likely to grow than larger ﬁrms. However when we look at the post reform period we see
that, after 1991, ﬁr m so f1 5e m p l o y e e sa r em o r el i k e l yt og r o wt h a nb e f o r e1 9 9 1( c o l u m n2 ,
positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on dummy15 × Post).A n da m o n gﬁrms of 15 employees, the
best ﬁrms which pay on average higher wages (before 1990) are more likely to grow (column
3, positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on dummy15 × Post× FE j). These results are consistent
with the following pattern: “good” ﬁrms, which were keeping their size just at 15 for fear
of incurring in high EPL before 1991, were more willing to grow over 15 after the reform
because the distance of EPL costs between small and large ﬁrms was reduced.
Notice that this pattern has diﬀerent eﬀects on the discontinuity depending on whether
the “good” ﬁrms of 15 employees that passed the threshold because of the reform were paying,
on average, higher or lower wages than the ﬁr m sa b o v et h et h r e s h o l d .I nt h eﬁrst (second)
case, the discontinuity gets larger (smaller) and OLS estimates are upward (downward)
biased, because the ﬂow of ﬁrms raises (lowers) wages in large ﬁrms relative to small ﬁrms
after the reform. In any case, the existence of some form of ﬁrms’ sorting, justiﬁes our
attempt of instrumenting ﬁrm size in the regressions.
5.3 Regression model
Figure 1 and 2 show that an eﬀect on wages is likely to be found in the sample of displaced
rather than in the sample of the new hires. Before proceeding to the formal regression we
verify whether the hypothesis of independence of the observable characteristics from the
treatment status is valid in our sample. Table 1 considers the sample of displaced male
workers in ﬁrms between 10 and 20 employees and provides descriptive statistics of the
covariates for ﬁrms above and below the 15 employees threshold before and after the reform.
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diﬀerent in small and large ﬁrms neither before nor after the reform, thus suggesting that
the covariates are independent of treatment status, at least around the threshold.16
Table 1 also shows a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the average real wages in small and
large ﬁrms, before and after the reform. The mean wage paid in small ﬁrms after the reform
is 2% lower than the wage paid in large ﬁrms. However, the sample average, even in a
narrow neighborhood of the threshold, is in general a biased estimate of the true conditional
expectation function at the threshold when the function has non-zero slope. To address this
problem we turn to a regression model and estimate the size of the discontinuity including a
polynomial in ﬁrm size. In particular, wages are regressed on polynomials of various orders
in ﬁrm size.
The ideal experiment to measure the eﬀect of a change in EPL would have ﬁrms and
workers exogenously assigned to the treatment status. If this was the case, simple OLS
estimates of the following model would identify the causal eﬀect of EPL on wages:
logwijt = β
0























jt =1 [ ﬁrm size ≤ 15 in year t]
Post =1 [ year ≥ 1991]
The dependent variable is the (log of the) weekly wage paid to worker i by ﬁrm j in year t,
and is given by the yearly wage divided by the number of paid weeks. Since the EPL reform
may have aﬀected wages diﬀerently at entry and during the employment relationship, we will
estimate the eﬀect of the reform both on entry wages and on the tenure-earnings proﬁle. The
variable Post is a dummy that takes the value of 1 after 1991 and zero otherwise; DS
jt is a
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the worker is employed in year t in a small ﬁrm and 0 if the
worker is employed in a big ﬁrm. Tenijt is tenure of worker i in ﬁrm j at time t starting from
0 in the year of entry in the new ﬁrm. The interaction term DS
jt × Post between the small
ﬁrm dummy and the post-reform dummy is included to capture the eﬀect of the EPL reform
on entry wages (i.e. at zero tenure: Tenijt =0 ). Similarly, the term Tenijt × DS
jt × Post
identiﬁes the eﬀect of interest on the tenure-earnings proﬁle, i.e. it measures the eﬀect of
a one year increase in tenure on the post-reform wages of small ﬁrms workers relative to
large ﬁrms workers. The matrix Xijt contains a polynomial of third degree in ﬁrm size. In
some speciﬁcations, baseline covariates are included in the regression to reduce the sampling
16Tenure is measured in years starting from zero upon entry in a new ﬁrm after displacement, thus it
ranges from 0 to 3 in the pre-reform period and from 0 to 8 in the post reform period.
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age and occupation (white collar/blue collar dummy), the geographical location of the ﬁrm
(four dummies), industry and year eﬀects. The reported standard errors account for possible
error correlations at the individual level.
5.4 Firms’ sorting and the IV model
In a perfect Lazear world, there is no sorting neither of workers nor of ﬁrms and every increase
in EPL is adjusted through changes in wages. Yet the existence of ﬁrms’ and workers’ sorting
is an empirical question, and potentially biases our estimates of the relationship between
wages and ﬁrm size. To deal with this problem we use an IV strategy. As an instrument
for the ﬁrm size dummy, we use ﬁrm size dummies (above/below 15 employees) in 1987,
1988 and 1989. This instrument is not aﬀected by the reform as long as the reform was
unexpected.17 The formal speciﬁcation looks as follows:
logwijt = β




















































jt×Post) are also instrumented
using the interaction with DS
jpre.
6T h e e ﬀects of the 1990 reform
6.1 Results on the sample of New Hires
T a b l e4r e p o r t st h ec o e ﬃcients and standard errors of equation (2) estimated on the sample
of New Hires. This sample includes all male workers starting a new job, coming either from
another ﬁrm or from outside the sample.











. All speciﬁcations include a third degree polynomial in ﬁrm size.18
17We checked that the ﬁrst published news of the intention to change the EPL rules for small ﬁrms
appeared in the main Italian ﬁnancial newspaper — Il Sole 24 Ore — at the end of January 1990.
18The results carry over to the inclusion of quadratic and quartic polynomials in ﬁrm size.
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tively. Columns 3 to 5 present the IV estimates. To the traditional controls we add a
measure of ﬁrm-level job creation with the intent of controlling for the ﬁrm-speciﬁcg r o w t h
trend. The use of this variable should reassure us that the coeﬃcients are not reﬂecting
omitted trends which may predate the introduction of the reform and could otherwise be
confounded with the eﬀect of the reform. It may be the case that ﬁrms that are growing
strongly are also paying more to guarantee workers’ eﬀort (Belzil 2000). The variable is
deﬁned as:
2(ejt−ejt−1)
(ejt+ejt−1) where ejt is employment of ﬁrm j at time t.
All speciﬁcations, except for a weak eﬀect in columns 3 and 5, show no signiﬁcant eﬀects
of the 1990 EPL reform neither on entry wages of male workers nor on the tenure-wage
proﬁle. The addition of the covariates (year and sectoral dummies, a quadratic in age and
occupation) in columns 2 and 5 does not change the results with respect to the corresponding
columns 1, 3 and 4. Indeed, if the covariates are independent of the treatment status the
estimates are expected to be insensitive to the inclusion of those covariates. Also the inclusion
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc job growth does not seem to change the results.
However, these results are obtained on a sample where the treatment status is unlikely
to be exogenous. We focus next on the sample of displaced workers.
6.2 Results on the Sample of Displaced Workers
It is plausible that workers sort themselves into (or out of) the treatment group depending
on their preferences on the trade-oﬀ between wages and job security. This implies that the
treatment status is not exogenous. For this reason we select a sample of workers exogenously
displaced as a consequence of plant closings. Plant closings are deﬁned using information on
the ﬁrms’ date of closure. However, the variable "date of closure" does not always correspond
to a real closure as it may also capture an ownership transfer. "False" closures (e.g. closures
due to mergers or acquisitions) are deﬁned as all those episodes where more than 50% of the
employees of the closing ﬁrm are found in another ﬁrm.
Table 5 shows the results from OLS estimates on the sample of displaced workers.
Columns 1 and 2 show no signiﬁcant eﬀects of the EPL reform on entry wages and a sig-
niﬁcant negative eﬀect of as much as 3% on the returns to tenure. A comparison of Tables
4 and 5 seems to indicate that the presence of workers sorting leads to a positive bias of
the OLS estimates. If better workers moved out of small ﬁrms towards larger ﬁrms after
the reform, this would lead to higher estimates of the eﬀect of the reform on wages in small
ﬁrms because those workers whose wages would be reduced had moved away. The sample
of displaced workers is meant to address, in the best possible way, the issue of workers’
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the endogeneity of the treatment status on the ﬁrm side.
6.3 IV results
Self-selection into the treatment status may also aﬀect ﬁrms: marginal ﬁrms, which kept
their size just below 15 before the reform, may decide to cross the 15 employees threshold
because of the change in EPL. To control for the sorting of ﬁrms, we instrument the treatment
status (the dummy ﬁrm size lower than 15 employees) using ﬁrm size dummies in 1987, 1988
and 1989 when the reform was not in place and was arguably unexpected.
Table 5 reports the coeﬃcients and the standard errors obtained from the estimation of
equations (3) and (4) estimated on the sample of displaced workers. Once we address all
sources of endogeneity, we ﬁnd that the reform aﬀects negatively the wage-tenure proﬁle
(columns 3 to 5). The magnitude of the results is unchanged with respect to the OLS results
of columns 1 and 2.
Our results rest on the validity of the continuity condition (1). We test the validity of this
condition in the sample of displaced workers following Lee (2007). The test is implemented
by running the same OLS and IV regressions (2) and (3) on the sample of displaced workers
using as a dependent variable a pre-intervention outcome, namely the wage at the time of
displacement. Such outcome should not be aﬀected by the size of the ﬁrm after displacement
neither before nor after the 1990 reform, while still depending on the same unobservables
(e.g. ability) likely to aﬀect post-displacement wages. This exercise allows to test not only
the validity of the continuity condition but also the conclusion that even if displaced workers
a r ea b l et oc h o o s ei nw h i c hﬁrm to work after displacement, they do not sort around the 15
employees threshold. A negative coeﬃcient on the interaction between the small ﬁrm dummy
and the post-reform dummy would indicate that, after the reform, individuals employed in
small ﬁrms have a disproportionately lower income in their pre-displacement job. This would
suggest the possibility that lower ability workers self-select, after the reform, into small ﬁrms.
Results are reported in Table 9. Columns 1 and 2 show the OLS estimates. Once we control
for workers and ﬁrms characteristics, OLS estimates indicate that pre-displacement wages are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for workers subsequently employed in small ﬁrms, neither before
nor after the 1990 reform. Results from IV regressions reported in columns 3 and 4 conﬁrm
this conclusion. Thus, Table 9 supports the validity of the continuity condition (1) on which
our identiﬁcation strategy is based and the absence of sorting of displaced workers.
We are ﬁnally worried about the endogeneity of tenure. It could be the case that the
increase in EPL costs also changes the incentives to ﬁre workers and therefore increases
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the inclusion of tenure, we re-estimate the model on a sample of workers with short tenure
(between 0 and 2 years in Table 6 and between 0 and 1 years in Table 7). The results of
Table 6 and 7 seem to conﬁrm that workers pay a higher penalty in early years of tenure.
The coeﬃcient on returns to tenure is reduced in small ﬁrms with respect to big ﬁrms by
almost 20% between the ﬁrst and the second year and by 9% between the ﬁr s ta n dt h et h i r d
year. We view this result as consistent with Lazear’s theory according to which workers
pre-pay at entry the increase in EPL cost. The fact that the reduction in wages occurs in
the early years of tenure rather than at entry may be explained by the existence of binding
minimum wages at entry.
6.4 Results by industry and occupation
The results of Table 4 and Table 5 show that there is no eﬀect on wages of new hires but
t h e r ei sar o b u s tn e g a t i v ee ﬀect on returns to tenure for the displaced. This evidence is in
favor of a Lazear eﬀect which posits that wages adjust to oﬀset the additional costs of EPL.
However a better test of the Lazear model would also exploit the diﬀerences in ﬁrm-level
wage ﬂexibility across industry and occupation. For the Lazear model to work, we need wage
setting at the ﬁrm level which is capable to undo the eﬀects of EPL. To measure the extent
of ﬁrm-level bargaining we use a measure of wage drift deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
average total compensation and the centrally bargained contractual wage. Unfortunately we
d on o th a v eam e a s u r eo ft h ew a g ed r i f ta tt h eﬁrm level but we have average measures at
the industry and occupation level from nationally representative data (see Devicienti, Maida
and Sestito, 2005). In construction and among blue collars the wage drift is substantially
lower than in manufacturing and white collar occupations respectively. The Lazear model
predicts that where wages are free to adjust, there should be less employment adjustment
and viceversa. Employment ﬂows are measured as the rate of accessions and separations.
Table 8 shows the impact of the reform on wages (of displaced workers) and employment
ﬂows for blue collars, white collars, the manufacturing and the construction sector separately.
The table indicates no clear inverse relationship between the eﬀect on wages and employment.
The reform seems to have had the expected negative eﬀect on accessions and separations
but only among blue collars there is a negative wage adjustment. This is not what we would
expect according to the theory that wage adjustment is easier in sectors or occupations where
the wage drift is higher, since blue collars enjoy a relative low wage drift. The explanations we
oﬀer for this evidence is that the wage drift is not a perfect measure of contractual ﬂexibility
at the ﬁrm level and that the negative correlation between adjustment through wages and
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quantities may be present at ﬁner deﬁnition of industry and occupation or at the ﬁrm level.7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper provides evidence on the impact of a change in dismissal costs on wages using a
reform of EPL in Italy which increased severance payments after 1990 for ﬁrms with fewer
than 15 employees relative to larger ﬁrms.
If workers and ﬁrms are exogenously assigned to the treatment status, a Regression
Discontinuity Design will identify the causal eﬀect of EPL on wages measuring the diﬀerence
b e t w e e nw a g e si ns m a l la n dl a r g eﬁrms around the threshold before and after the reform.
However the results may be biased if ﬁrms and workers sort around the ﬁfteen employees
threshold. The increase in EPL in 1990 applied only to ﬁrms with fewer than 15 workers,
thus closing the gap in employer protection provision between ﬁr m sb e l o wa n da b o v et h e1 5
employees threshold. This may have induced ﬁrms, which kept their size marginally below
the threshold to avoid expensive EPL, to increase their size above 15 employees. This may
also have created incentives for workers to move across the threshold according to their
preferences for the mix of EPL and wages prevalent in small rather than big ﬁrms.
We address workers’ sorting by considering a sample of workers exogenously displaced
due to plant closings, and ﬁrms’ sorting by instrumenting the treatment status using ﬁrm
size prior to the reform. We ﬁnd that average returns to tenure of displaced male workers
declined by around 3% in ﬁrms below 15 employees, relative to larger ﬁrms, because of the
1990 EPL. The decline is concentrated in the early years of tenure.
These ﬁndings may be interpreted within the Lazear’s neutrality framework. The Lazear
bonding critique predicts that, in absence of contractual or market frictions, a ﬁrm can undo
a government-mandated transfer (severance payment) reducing the wages of new entrants
by an amount equal to the expected increase in the future transfer. Our empirical results are
partially consistent with Lazear’s delayed-payment scheme: using our estimates is possible
t oc a l c u l a t eh o wm u c ho ft h ei n c r e a s ei nt h eﬁring cost is translated onto lower wages. We
start by considering the situation of a employer-initiated separation of a worker of average
tenure in a small ﬁrm after the reform. If the separation is ruled unfair by the judge, the
ﬁring cost will range between 2.5 and 6 months (on average 16 weeks) of the last wage. On
the basis of our data, the post-reform average weekly wage of an employee of 3.5 years of
tenure amounts to approximately 287 euros. Therefore, the severance pay transferred to the
worker amounts to 287 × 16 weeks=4 ,604 euros, excluding the legal expenses that can be
roughly calculated to equal as much as 5,000 euros. The above computation results in a very
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July 2007high ﬁring cost, but we should keep in mind that this is the worst possible scenario for the
ﬁrm. Ex-ante, the ﬁrm does not know with certainty whether the separation will be ruled
unfair by the court. Furthermore, ﬁrms and workers may ﬁnd a settlement out of court.
Galdón-Sánchez and Güell (2000), using data based on actual court sentences, estimate that
in Italy the probability of reaching an oﬀ-court agreement to be around 0.5 and probability
that the dismissal is ruled unfair to be about 0.5. Assuming that, in case of an oﬀ-court
agreement, the employer pays approximately the sum due in form of severance pay, ﬁrms
below 15 employees can expect a ﬁring cost equal to 4,604 × 0.5=2 ,302 euros excluding
legal expenses.
On the basis of our estimates in Table 5, after 3.5 years of tenure the cumulative wage loss
amounts to 19.5 euros per week or 1,011 e u r o sp e ry e a r .T h i si m p l i e st h a tﬁrms translate
around 44% of the expected ﬁring cost onto lower wages. Of course, this calculation is valid
only at the average tenure of 3.5 years.
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July 2007Table 1: Descriptive statistics (Displaced Workers)
Variables
Small firms Large firms Small firms Large firms
Diff-in-Diff
6.271 6.267 6.372 6.431 -0.063
(0.237) (0.237) (0.234) (0.284) [0.013]
36.948 36.680 38.311 39.299
(9.37) (9.727) (8.995) (9.163)
0.142 0.111 0.168 0.204
(0.35) (0.314) (0.374) (0.403)
12.342 17.742 12.386 17.930
(1.707) (1.402) (1.715) (1.499)
0.821 0.973 2.634 2.558
(0.96) (1.01) (2.391) (2.333)




Notes: Only firms between 10 and 20 workers are included. Standard deviations in parentheses. 






Working Paper Series No 778































N 104061 104061 97858
Post 1990 × Firms Fixed Effect (× 1000)
Post 1990 × Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 13 (× 1000)
Post 1990 × Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 14 (× 1000)
Post 1990 × Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 15 (× 1000)
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if in firm j employment at time t is larger
than employment at time t-1, and 0 otherwise. Only firms between 5 and 25 workers are included. All




Post 1990 × Dummy 13
Post 1990 × Dummy 14
Post 1990 × Dummy 15
Firms Fixed Effect (× 1000)
Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 13 (× 1000)
Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 14 (× 1000)
Firms Fixed Effect × Dummy 15 (× 1000)
Dependent Variable: employment growth dummy
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Dependent Variable:  mover dummy
0.026 0.015 0.004 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.031 0.022 0.004 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.011 0.000 0.004 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.008 0.0001 0.041 0.041
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
- -0.029 - -0.025
- (0.005) - (0.004)
- 0.043 - -0.014
- (0.012) - (0.009)
-0.008 -0.017 -0.004 -0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
-0.011 -0.019 -0.006 -0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
0.007 0.003 -0.006 -0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
- -0.007 - 0.003
- (0.006) - (0.005)
- -0.028 - -0.001
- (0.007) - (0.005)
- -0.003 - -0.003
- (0.007) - (0.005)
- 0.001 - -0.014
- (0.015) - (0.012)
- 0.058 - 0.001
- (0.016) - (0.012)
- 0.057 - 0.002
- (0.016) - (0.012)
N 1603117 1412427 1603117 1412427
Table 3: Workers sorting (Years 1986-1994)
P>15 P ≤ 15
Workers FE × Dummy 1990 × Small Firm Dummy (× 1000)
Workers FE × Dummy 1991 × Small Firm Dummy (× 1000)
Small firm dummy × Dummy 1991
Dummy 1991
Small firm dummy
Small firm dummy × Dummy 1989
Workers Fixed Effect (× 1000)
Workers Fixed Effect × Small firm dummy (× 1000)
Notes: In the first (last) two columns the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if worker i 
moves to a firm with more (less) than 15 employees and 0 otherwise. Firms of all sizes included. All
specifications include a quadratic in workers' age, year dummies, sector dummies and a polynomial in the size
of the firm of origin.
Workers Fixed Effect × Dummy 1989 (× 1000)
Small firm dummy × Dummy 1990
Dummy 1989
Dummy 1990
Workers Fixed Effect × Dummy 1990 (× 1000)
Workers Fixed Effect × Dummy 1991 (× 1000)
Workers FE × Dummy 1989 × Small Firm Dummy (× 1000)
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Dependent Variable: log wage
0.038 0.020 0.032 0.033 0.015
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.059 0.091 0.020 0.033 0.039
(0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
0.013 0.015 0.169 0.038 -0.183
(0.005) (0.005) (0.123) (0.132) (0.117)
-0.003 -0.002 0.043 0.025 0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.02) (0.021) (0.019)
-0.015 -0.002 -0.011 -0.011 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
-0.0003 -0.0001 0.009 0.010 0.011
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
N 122954 122954 89248 87989 87989
Job creation/job destruction NO NO NO YES YES
Additional controls NO YES NO NO YES
Notes: Only firms between 10 and 20 workers are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses
allow for clustering by individual. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in firm size.
In columns 4 and 5 we control for job creation/job destruction at the firm level. Additional controls
added in columns 2 and 5 are: year dummies, sector dummies, age, age squared, and occupation.
The treatment status (above/below 15 employees) is instrumented with size dummies in the pre-
reform period (1987, 1988 and 1989).
OLS IV
Post 1990 × Tenure
Small firms × Tenure
Small firms × Post 1990 × Tenure
Table 4: New Hires in years 1986-1994 (excl. 1990). OLS and IV estimates.
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Dependent Variable: log wage
0.015 -0.004 0.013 0.010 0.000
(0.008) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.160 0.135 0.219 0.194 0.106
(0.018) (0.016) (0.04) (0.037) (0.038)
-0.020 -0.023 -0.357 -0.208 0.037
(0.021) (0.019) (0.196) (0.21) (0.188)
-0.040 0.002 -0.132 -0.098 -0.002
(0.021) (0.018) (0.061) (0.059) (0.053)
-0.008 0.009 -0.010 -0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
0.030 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.029
(0.01) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
-0.030 -0.038 -0.027 -0.029 -0.032
(0.01) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
N 6098 6098 4702 4638 4638
Job creation/job destruction NO NO NO YES YES
Additional controls NO YES NO NO YES
Table 5: Displaced workers in years 1986-1994 (excl. 1990). OLS and IV estimates.




Notes: Only firms between 10 and 20 workers are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses
allow for clustering by individual. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in firm size.
In columns 4 and 5 we control for job creation/job destruction at the firm level. Additional controls
added in columns 2 and 5 are: year dummies, sector dummies, age, age squared, and occupation.
The treatment status (above/below 15 employees) is instrumented with size dummies in the pre-
reform period (1987, 1988 and 1989).
OLS IV
Post 1990 × Tenure
Small firms × Tenure
Small firms × Post 1990 × Tenure
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Dependent Variable: log wage
0.006 -0.013 0.001 -0.001 -0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
0.144 0.148 0.139 0.119 0.073
(0.019) (0.018) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044)
0.020 -0.001 -0.005 0.126 0.181
(0.023) (0.021) (0.18) (0.191) (0.164)
-0.041 0.002 -0.034 -0.009 0.032
(0.023) (0.02) (0.07) (0.068) (0.06)
0.020 0.029 0.052 0.054 0.044
(0.017) (0.016) (0.032) (0.032) (0.03)
0.041 0.052 0.048 0.043 0.043
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
-0.043 -0.051 -0.089 -0.087 -0.067
(0.021) (0.018) (0.047) (0.047) (0.042)
N 4322 4322 3165 3101 3101
Job creation/job destruction NO NO NO YES YES
Additional controls NO YES NO NO YES
Notes: Only firms between 10 and 20 workers and workers with at most three years of tenure are
included. Robust standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering by individual. All
specifications include a third degree polynomial in firm size. In columns 4 and 5 we control for job
creation/job destruction at the firm level. Additional controls added in columns 2 and 5 are: year
dummies, sector dummies, age, age squared, and occupation. The treatment status (above/below 15
employees) is instrumented with size dummies in the pre-reform period (1987, 1988 and 1989).
OLS IV
Post 1990 × Tenure
Small firms × Tenure
Small firms × Post 1990 × Tenure
Table 6: Displaced workers with at most three years of tenure. Years 1986-1994 (excl. 1990)
OLS and IV estimates.
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Dependent Variable: log wage
-0.027 -0.037 -0.028 -0.033 -0.033
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
0.135 0.144 0.084 0.073 0.049
(0.02) (0.021) (0.049) (0.048) (0.046)
0.033 0.009 0.031 0.080 0.113
(0.025) (0.023) (0.161) (0.172) (0.159)
-0.032 0.010 0.038 0.045 0.087
(0.024) (0.02) (0.07) (0.069) (0.063)
0.051 0.060 0.167 0.166 0.166
(0.027) (0.025) (0.051) (0.051) (0.048)
0.082 0.084 0.081 0.076 0.065
(0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
-0.072 -0.087 -0.226 -0.212 -0.216
(0.033) (0.029) (0.073) (0.074) (0.068)
N 3444 3444 2480 2416 2416
Job creation/job destruction NO NO NO YES YES
Additional controls NO YES NO NO YES
Table 7: Displaced workers with at most two years of tenure. Years 1986-1994 (excl. 1990)
OLS and IV estimates.




Notes: Only firms between 10 and 20 workers and workers with at most two years of tenure are
included. Robust standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering by individual. All
specifications include a third degree polynomial in firm size. In columns 4 and 5 we control for job
creation/job destruction at the firm level. Additional controls added in columns 2 and 5 are: year
dummies, sector dummies, age, age squared, and occupation. The treatment status (above/below 15
employees) is instrumented with size dummies in the pre-reform period (1987, 1988 and 1989).
OLS IV
Post 1990 × Tenure
Small firms × Tenure
Small firms × Post 1990 × Tenure
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Notes: The dependent variables in columns 3 and 4 are, respectively, a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a
match (repsectively, a separation) between worker iand firm joccurs at time tand 0 otherwise. Only firms
between 10 and 20 workers are included. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in firm size, job
creation/job destruction at the firm level, year dummies, sector dummies, age, age squared, tenure and
occupation. The treatment status (above/below 15 employees) is instrumented with size dummies in the pre-









Post 1990 × Small Firm
Small firms × Post 1990 × Tenure
Post 1990 × Small Firm
Small firms × Post 1990 × Tenure






Post 1990 × Small Firm
Small firms × Post 1990 × Tenure
129595 129595
N 4638 156901 156901
Post 1990 × Small Firm
Small firms × Post 1990 × Tenure
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Dependent Variable: wage at 
displacement
0.164 0.112 0.103 0.108
(0.023) (0.026) (0.059) (0.059)
-0.001 -0.013 0.267 0.380
(0.032) (0.03) (0.298) (0.315)
-0.055 -0.018 0.025 0.063
(0.028) (0.024) (0.086) (0.083)
N 2092 2092 1445 1445
Controls NO YES NO YES
Table 9: Effects of the reform on workers wages and firm size at displacement. IV estimates
Post 1990 × Small firms 
Post 1990 
Small firms
Notes: Only firms between 10 and 20 workers are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses
allow for clustering by individual. All specifications include a third degree polynomial in firm size.
Controls added in columns 2 and 4 are: year dummies, sector dummies, age, age squared, and
occupation. The treatment status (above/below 15 employees) is instrumented with size dummies in
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